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Foreword  

A degree of shock never experienced before, the events of Sept. 11, 2001 introduced the world community to terrorism of another kind. Political leadership in the United States of America (US), assisted by their intelligence agencies, was quick to respond to the situation in three ways. Firstly, the leadership felt the need to calm the panicked and anxious citizens and take immediate precautionary measures. Secondly, it devised some short-term initiatives to bring the confidence of the people back as a nation. And thirdly, they took longer-term initiatives to prevent the world from experiencing such traumas in future.

This Study is an outcome of research grant we received from United States Institute for Peace(USIP) and part funding from Mennonite Central Committee and Technical Support from Centre for Justice and peacebuilding, Eastern Mennonite University, VA, USA.

Hassan M. Yousufzai & Ali Gohar

March 2005

In the immediate aftermath of this incident, the people of the US looked confused and helpless. Prior to these events, Americans could afford to have little concern for the world outside of the US.  The reality of terrorism of this magnitude on their own soil forced Americans to stretch beyond their previous mental boundaries. Explanations of this event began to appear.  The suicide phenomenon to the people of the developed world seemed to be attributed mostly to a psychological disorder. Then theories of religious fanaticism emerged and, subsequently, the U.S and other members of the world community settled for what many people, communities and nations consider the brutal and blind response of military force.  In the war on terrorism, the only visible target was Osama Bin Laden, a native Arab and a one time strong ally of the US secret services, who later turned against the US government policies. We were told that this person was residing in Afghanistan.  Afghanistan became the first battleground for this new war on terrorism.

We, the principal researchers of this work, belong to Peshawar in Pakistan, a place just a few miles away from the Pak-Afghan border. We speak the Afghani language as our mother tongue. A few days before September 11, 2001, we landed in the US as Fulbright Fellows to study Conflict Transformation at Eastern Mennonite University (EMU) in Virginia. As Pakistanis and Muslims—­probably the only two Muslims at a Christian university—we suddenly found ourselves barraged with questions from common Americans. Media people rushed to find Muslims in their area. University colleagues came with bundles of questions and community groups invited us for talks.

As we tried to respond to their difficult and often highly technical questions, we noticed that the questions generally centered on three themes:

• Who were the suicide bombers?
• Why they did this to us?
• What should we do now?

To the first question, no one had an immediate answer, but it was clear from the statements of national leadership that the attackers were Muslims and they were friends of Osama. To the second question, the national leadership devised a new theory of terrorism, a term previously used to describe acts of indiscriminate violence within a national or domestic framework. To the third question, no one had a clue.

With the natural bias for peace and tolerance, the EMU community prayed for the victims, gave lots of support to us, and continued to ponder the above questions. To the Mennonites, violence in the name of peace or security is unjustifiable—a stance with which many people in government do not agree. It was under these circumstances that we, as Muslims and Pakistanis of Afghan origin, were expected to give satisfactory answers to our American fellows.

Our understanding of conflict, as students of peacebuilding, is that conflict is an opportunity to address the long-standing issues between parties. In conflicts, violence is used either as an act of vengeance or as a source of communication from one party to the other. Violence to us is a phenomenon, which will invariably attract further violence at least in the long run.

To respond to the above three questions, we started with the basics. The first question, while a matter of scientific investigation, called us to remain cautious, as we may never knew the clear identity of the perpetrators.  In addition, we bore in mind that the perpetrators may be perceived as martyrs by others in the world. 

The second question to us was not a simple one either, but it was clear that the act was not carried out to just destroy buildings and kill innocent civilians: the act definitely carried a deeper message and symbolism.  This looked more like a communication of another kind in which parties did not seek to understand each other.  Perhaps the parties in this conflict did not have any other platform on which to put their issues before the other for discussion. Or perhaps one party was too strong and arrogant to pay heed to the concerns of the weaker party.

To the last question again, our understanding remains that an act of violence will beget further violence; therefore for a U.S response of military force against Osama Bin Laden and the Afghani people will not lead to a cessation of terrorism. The question of what action should be taken in response to the September 11 hijackings leads us back to the second question:  why did these hijackings occur?  What is it that the U.S needs to understand about Osama’s violent form of communication? Violence is not only a psychological disorder.  A party operating from a place of fear and insecurity may resort to violence when unable to communicate a message and feel heard through a verbal medium.

As the US-led attack on Afghanistan to hunt Osama became imminent, we argued that, in order to achieve strategic objectives, there was a need for peaceful dialogue with the people of Afghanistan, as opposed to the use of force.  Regular diplomatic norms of the nation state system were not possible, however, as the US did not formally recognize the Taliban government. Our suggestion to the US policy makers was to try to utilize the indigenous Afghan social institution of Jirga as a forum to sort out all outstanding issues between war trodden people and one of the most powerful governments of the world.  In the US, there was little enthusiasm for this because of many factors.  It appeared that the US government was in a hurry to launch an offensive on helpless Afghan people because it was the quickest remedy to the painful experience of September 11.  As EMU professor and conflict transformation practitioner, Ron Kraybill, would always remind, “If a hammer is the only tool in your box, everything will look like a nail”.

Having lived under a civil war for three decades, the people of Afghanistan were once again destined to face effects of collateral damage, a term so easy to pronounce, but so difficult to afford. Yet, at the end of the day, the US Government invited a national conference of Afghans, called a Loya Jirga, at Bonn in the spring of 2002. However, the Bonn Jirga was held without getting a hold of Osama, the suspected mastermind of September 11 attacks.

Politics and sociology must go hand in hand, as both affect the destinies of common people living in the global village. Where politics bring change in the societies, sociology must enable people to adjust to positive changes.  In the absence of a formal political platform, the Afghan culture allowed a quick formation of Loya Jirga, a quasi-political and quasi-social institution, which enabled the war trodden people to get back to a socio-political order of some kind.  What would have happened if the Pukhtoon culture didn’t have this tradition?  Does the nation state system provide for a contingency where a nation can make a peaceful start without any formal institutions?  Why is it necessary to identify and respect such cultural understandings not included in the systems of political science?  As these questions arose, we felt the need to describe what Jirga is and how it operates. Is it an outdated and obsolete institution or it is capable to face challenges of the present day systems?

We are obliged to the US Institute of Peace for encouraging us to work more on the subject and sponsor our two years of research work in the field. We also thank the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) for adding partial funding for the project. We went out to talk to over two hundred people who are associated with Jirga in one way or another. The journey took us across all the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of NWFP (North West Frontier Province), settled districts of the province, the Pukhtoon districts of Balochistan Province, and a few provinces of Afghanistan, including Kabul and Jalalabad. As this is the very first work to explore the dynamics of Jirga, an effort is made to touch only the very basics of Jirga. This work is an overview of the whole system of Jirga, so as to present a comprehensive and focused work on this long neglected, but well tested, indigenous institution that has influenced the lives of millions of Pukhtoons over hundreds of years of its history.

Many people helped develop this work along the way. The project leader Vernon Jantzi gave us lots of technical input from time to time, while Janice M. Jenner helped us work on designing the project proposal and looking after the budget side. Amy Potter helped us consolidate our work and present it for publication. Our domestic associates include hundreds of people who agreed to spare their precious time, some in pre-organized sessions and others at informal chats, to talk to us on Jirga. Supper talks with elders and peers vastly enriched our understanding of the processes involved in Jirga. We duly acknowledge the value of information on Jirga put up on the Internet by many freelance as well as professionals which has been used to improve our understanding of Jirga. We remain thankful to the proprietors of all those web sites we used during the course of our inquiry. Special contributions of Ikram Hoti, Usman Yaqub, Javed Akhtar, Askar, Nadia Shams, Kashif Karim, Memoona and Noor Akbar Khalil helped with final compilation of work. Kirstin Rothrock’s hard and timely help enabled to give final shape to the document. We sincerely thank all our associates, colleagues and peers without whose contributions; this work would not have been possible.

 Hassan M Yousufzai & Ali Gohar

January 2005

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